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When Will It Finally End: The Effectiveness of the
Rule 10b-5 Private Action as a Fraud-Deterrence
Mechanism Post-Janus
I wasted no time; I got some people in, we drafted a rule, we
presented it to the Commission, and, without any hesitation, the
Commission tossed the paper on the table saying they were in
favor of it. One Commission member said, “Well, we’re against
fraud, aren’t we?” So, before the sun was down, we had the rule
that is now Rule 10b-5.1
The above is Milton Freeman’s succinct description of the
process behind the passage of Rule 10b-5. Known as the “father of
Rule 10b-5,” Freeman guided the effort that culminated in the
rule’s birth.2 Passed pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5 is a broad antifraud provision that
essentially prohibits all fraud in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities.3 At its birth, not even the “father of Rule 10b-5”
could predict what his child would one day become.4 No one
anticipated that Rule 10b-5 would give rise to a private right of
action that would eventually become the subject of thousands of
opinions attempting to define it.5 Neither Section 10(b) nor Rule
10b-5 contains language providing for a private cause of action
under the rule.6 Instead, federal courts have implied it.7 Hence,
when courts look at the 10b-5 private action, they are dealing with
Copyright 2013, by JUSTIN MAROCCO.
1. Milton V. Freeman, Colloquium Foreword, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S1,
S1–S2 (1993) (emphasis added). This occurred prior to the passage of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, so the procedure to pass a new rule was
much more informal than in the present day. See id. at S2.
2. See id. at S1, S3.
3. Rule 10b-5 prohibits: (1) employing “any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud”; (2) making “any untrue statement of a material fact or [failing] to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading”; and (3)
engaging “in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
4. See Freeman, supra note 1, at S2.
5. See W. Taylor Marshall, Note, Securities Law––The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934––‘Round and ‘Round We Go: The Supreme Court Again
Limits the Circumstances in Which Federal Courts May Hold Secondary Actors
Liable Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008), 31 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 197, 204 (2008); see also Freeman, supra note 1, at S2
(evincing that the future of Rule 10b-5 was unexpected at its inception).
6. See discussion infra Part I.A.
7. See discussion infra Part I.A.
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“a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
acorn.”8 The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) passed Rule
10b-5 to prevent fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of
securities, and, despite a lack of express language providing for it,
the private right of action is the method used to implement this
deterrence purpose.9
The Supreme Court’s recent holding in Janus Capital Group,
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders puts the usefulness of the 10b-5
private action as a fraud-deterrence mechanism in serious doubt.10
In Janus, the Supreme Court clarified who “makes” a statement
under Rule 10b-5.11 The Court determined that “the maker of a
statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the
statement, including its content and whether and how to
communicate it.”12 Additionally, in a footnote, the majority
provided that attribution of a statement is key evidence regarding
who “makes” the statement.13 Consequently, Janus’s holding
opens the door for lower federal courts to absolve corporate
officers of liability for statements attributed solely to the
corporation, even if those statements were prepared and distributed
by the officer on the corporation’s behalf.14 This Note argues that
Janus has severely limited the 10b-5 private action’s effectiveness
as a fraud-deterrence mechanism and, in so doing, has removed
much of the disincentive for corporate officers to commit fraud.
Therefore, the SEC or Congress must step forward and take action
to reestablish the 10b-5 private action as a fraud-deterrence
mechanism.
Part I of this Note provides a brief background regarding
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, as well as a discussion on how
8. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
Justice Rehnquist’s oft-repeated analogy refers to the inability to decipher
Congress’s intent regarding the “contours of a private cause of action under rule
10b-5” based solely on the language of Section 10(b). Id.
9. See Freeman, supra note 1, at S1–S2; S. Michael Sirkin, The Deterrence
Paradox: How Making Securities Fraud Class Actions More Difficult for
Plaintiffs Will More Strongly Deter Corporate Fraud, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 307,
311 (2009) (quoting Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)). Freeman recognizes that the primary impetus behind
the passage of Rule 10b-5 was to prevent a company president from benefitting
from his dishonest conduct. See Freeman, supra note 1, at S1.
10. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
11. See id. at 2301.
12. Id. at 2302.
13. See id. at 2302 n.6.
14. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the private 10b-5 right of
action. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (Supp. V 2011); see also Will v. Calvert Fire Ins.
Co., 437 U.S. 655, 659 (1978).
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federal courts have implied the 10b-5 private cause of action. The
discussion then shifts to the Supreme Court’s decision in Central
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver and its rejection
of aiding-and-abetting liability for the 10b-5 private action. Part I
ends with an examination of the Court’s holding in Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., in which the
Court rejected “scheme liability.” Part II provides an in-depth
discussion of Janus, including the case’s intricate facts, the
majority’s holding, and the dissent’s counterargument. Part II
concludes with a discussion of the primary problem that Janus
created: the potential for corporate officers to escape liability for
their unattributed misstatements. Part III analyzes how the private
action should primarily be used for fraud deterrence and how
Janus eliminates much of this usefulness. Part III also argues that
Janus potentially affects the SEC’s ability to impose aiding-andabetting liability through an enforcement action. Furthermore, even
if Janus does not affect the SEC enforcement action, relying on the
enforcement action as the primary means to prosecute fraud and
deter conduct is a recipe for disaster. Finally, Part III recognizes
that Janus could signal a revival for Section 20(b) as an instrument
to impose liability on corporate officers who use their company as
the vehicle to carry out their fraudulent schemes. In Part IV, this
Note concludes by proposing a solution in the form of either a
federal statute or SEC rule addressing the problems that Janus
created, specifically the potential for corporate officers to escape
liability for their fraudulent misstatements.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to deal
with the weaknesses in the national securities markets that were
thought to have contributed to the market crash of 1929 and the
ensuing Great Depression.15 The Act regulates the post-distribution
trading of securities16 and seeks to institute a full-disclosure
15. See Robert J. Grubb, II, Attorneys, Accountants, and Bankers, Oh My!
Primary Liability for Secondary Actors in the Wake of Stoneridge, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 275, 281 (2009); Diana L. Hegarty, Rule 10b-5 and the Evolution of
Common-Law Fraud—The Need for an Effective Statutory Proscription of
Insider Tradition by Outsiders, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 813, 819 (1988).
16. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
171 (1994) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752
(1975)). The Securities Act of 1933 regulates the initial distribution of securities
to investors, whereas the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates securities
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philosophy in the markets.17 Pursuant to the Act, Congress created
the SEC and granted it extensive rulemaking authority.18
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits the use of
manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase
or sale of registered securities in violation of SEC rules and
regulations.19 In isolation, Section 10(b) is “nonself-operative”: It
requires an SEC rule or regulation to give it effect.20 Accordingly,
the SEC drafted Rule 10b-5 pursuant to its authority under Section
10(b).21 Of specific relevance, Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful “for
any person, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact . . . .”22
Although neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 provide for it,
federal courts have implied a private 10b-5 cause of action for
private plaintiffs to pursue the rule’s violators.23 The first court to do
so was the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co.24 The Supreme Court confirmed the private action’s
existence in 1971 and has consistently reaffirmed it.25

transactions after their initial distribution, both on stock exchanges and over-thecounter markets. Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-Going Debate
About Securities Self-Regulation: It’s Time to End FINRA’s Federal Income Tax
Exemption, 31 VA. TAX REV. 135, 142 (2011).
17. Sirkin, supra note 9, at 310 (quoting Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital
Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
18. Grubb, III, supra note 15, at 281 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006)).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Supp. V 2011).
20. Brian S. Sommer, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Improving
Balance in the Private Securities Litigation Arena with a Screening Panel
Approach, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 413, 419 (2005) (quoting Joseph A. Grundfest,
Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 977 (1994)).
21. Hegarty, supra note 15, at 813.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
23. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
The elements of the 10b-5 private cause of action are: “(1) a material
misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss;
and (6) loss causation.” Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct.
2179, 2181 (2011) (quoting Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct.
1309, 1317 (2011)).
24. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730 (citing Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co.,
69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)).
25. E.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 157 (2008). The Supreme Court first recognized the private cause of action
in Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
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B. Applicable Case Law
1. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver
After years of primarily expanding Rule 10b-5 and the private
right of action, the Supreme Court in Central Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver rendered a decision limiting the
effectiveness of the 10b-5 private action as a fraud-deterrence
mechanism by eliminating aiding-and-abetting liability under
Section 10(b).26 Central Bank served as a trustee for bonds issued
to finance improvements to a planned real estate development.27
As part of the bond agreement, liens were imposed on the land
where the planned development would be constructed.28 The
agreement required that the land be worth at least 160% of the
bonds’ remaining principal and interest amounts.29 Each year, the
real estate developer needed to furnish Central Bank with an
annual report in order for Central Bank to determine whether the
160% test was being met.30 From 1986 to 1988, the developer’s
annual report showed that the property value had not changed. As a
result, Central Bank became concerned that the 160% test was not
being satisfied.31 Central Bank initially decided to hire an outside
appraiser to review the 1988 appraisal but subsequently decided to
postpone the review until the end of 1988 after consulting with the
26. 511 U.S. 164 (1994); Scott M. Murray, Comment, Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver: The Supreme Court Chops a Bough
from the Judicial Oak: There is No Implied Private Remedy to Sue for Aiding
and Abetting Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV.
475, 478 n.17 (1996) (citing 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS,
SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD (1988)). According to Bromberg
and Lowenfels, a period of expansion began in 1934 with the passage of Rule
10b-5 and lasted until 1975. Murray, supra, at 478 n.17 (citing 1 BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS, supra § 2.2, at 461–530). Next, the Supreme Court went through a
seven-year period of contraction, but this period ended in 1982 when the Court
shifted from its restrictive trend. Murray, supra, at 478 n.17 (citing 1 BROMBERG
& LOWENFELS, supra § 2.2, at 463; Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375 (1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
(1982)).
27. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 167 (1994); see also Scott Siamas, Comment, Primary Securities Fraud
Liability for Secondary Actors: Revisiting Central Bank of Denver in the Wake
of Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 895, 902
(2004).
28. See Carrie E. Goodwin, Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank: Not
Just the End of Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b), 52 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1387, 1399 (1995).
29. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 167.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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developer.32 Before Central Bank could complete the independent
review, the issuer defaulted on the bonds.33
First Interstate Bank had purchased a sizeable portion of the
bonds.34 Due to its losses, First Interstate sued Central Bank for
violating Section 10(b) through recklessly aiding and abetting the
developer’s alleged fraudulent inflation of the property value.35
First Interstate did not seek to hold Central Bank liable for
violating the provisions of Section 10(b). Rather, it sought to hold
Central Bank liable for assisting with the developer’s alleged
Section 10(b) violation.36 After the lower courts focused on
whether Central Bank had the requisite scienter37 for imposing
aiding-and-abetting liability, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
but also requested that the parties brief the entirely new issue of
whether there actually was an aiding-and-abetting cause of action
under Section 10(b).38
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court rejected 30 years of lower court
precedent by holding that a private plaintiff could not sustain an
aiding-and-abetting action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.39 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on a strict construction of
Section 10(b).40 Looking at the text and history of Section 10(b), the
32. Id.
33. Id. at 168.
34. See id.
35. See id.; see also Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Corruption and the
Complicity of Congress and the Supreme Court—The Tortious Path from
Central Bank to Stoneridge Investment Partners, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131, 164
(2009). First Interstate claimed that the developer was primarily liable under
Section 10(b) because it “fraudulently inflated the value of the Colorado real
estate.” Goodwin, supra note 28, at 1401.
36. See Goodwin, supra note 28, at 1398.
37. Scienter refers to the “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 216 (1976). It is one of the elements of the
10b-5 private action. See discussion supra note 23.
38. Glen Shu, Comment, Take a Second Look: Central Bank After the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 539, 552
(1996). “The Court directed the parties to brief and argue the following
question: ‘Whether there is an implied private right of action for aiding and
abetting violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
SEC Rule 10b-5.’” Id. at 552 n.60 (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 508 U.S. 959, 959 (1993) (mem.)).
39. Robert A. Prentice, Locating That “Indistinct” and “Virtually
Nonexistent” Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(B),
75 N.C. L. REV. 691, 691 (1997); Murdock, supra note 35, at 163; Marshall, supra
note 5, at 211.
40. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 173 (1994); John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and
Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS.
LAW. 335, 341 (1996).
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Court found that Section 10(b) and the 10b-5 private action do not
impose aiding-and-abetting liability.41 Nevertheless, the Central
Bank majority limited its holding to maintain the possibility for
secondary actors42 to be primarily liable under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.43 After Central Bank, because secondary actors could
be primarily liable under Section 10(b) but not secondarily liable,
the Court would need to establish the line between primary liability
and secondary–aiding-and-abetting liability.44
2. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc.
Fourteen years after its Central Bank decision, the Supreme
Court began to define the line between primary and secondary
liability in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc.45 The fraudulent scheme in Stoneridge involved three
parties: Charter Communications (Charter), Scientific-Atlanta, and
Motorola.46 After Charter realized that it would fall short of its
yearly projected operating cash flow, it enlisted the help of its
suppliers, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, to help erase the
shortfall.47 Charter agreed to overpay $20 for each cable box, and
in return Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta agreed to use the
overpayments to purchase additional advertising from Charter.48
Charter executed its nefarious scheme through deceptive contracts
that were intentionally backdated in an attempt to hide their
connectivity.49 As a result of these contracts, Charter was able to
inflate its revenue and operating cash flow by $17 million, a figure
that was included in Charter’s SEC filings and reports to the
41. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 183.
42. The term secondary actors refers to every entity or individual who is
not the direct issuer of securities. Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Scope of
Secondary Actor Liability: Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 122 HARV. L. REV. 485, 485 n.3 (2008) (citing Taavi Annus, Note,
Scheme Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72
MO. L. REV. 855, 858 & n.25 (2007)).
43. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
44. Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Scope of Secondary Actor Liability,
supra note 42, at 485. See also Siamas, supra note 27, at 902. Primary liability
involves violating the provisions of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. See Cent.
Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
45. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
46. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 153–54 (2008).
47. Id. at 153.
48. Id. at 154.
49. See id. at 154–55.
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public.50 Despite actively engaging in the fraud, neither ScientificAtlanta nor Motorola aided in preparing, filing, or distributing
Charter’s financial statements.51
After the scheme came to light, Stoneridge filed a class action
lawsuit against Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola, alleging that their
participation in the fraudulent scheme was a violation of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.52 Stoneridge sought to impose “scheme
liability” (not aiding-and-abetting liability) on Motorola and
Scientific-Atlanta, on the grounds that their conduct helped further
Charter’s fraudulent scheme.53 Eventually, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve a split between the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits regarding the validity of scheme liability.54
50. Id. at 155; Grant T. Maynard, Comment, Catch Me if You Can: An
Analysis of the Reduction of Secondary Actors’ Private Liability in § 10(b)
Cases in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 761 (2008), 88 NEB. L. REV. 561, 569–70 (2010).
51. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 155.
52. See id.; Nelson Waneka, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. ScientificAtlanta: Rethinking the Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption and the Policy
Considerations Permeating the Court’s Decision, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 303, 314
(2008).
53. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159–60. Scheme liability provides that a
secondary actor who engages “in deceptive acts can be liable if [he] participate[s]
in a scheme to defraud investors, which results in misrepresentations being made
to investors.” Charles J. Wilkes, Secondary-Actor Liability in a Post-Stoneridge
World: Yes, a Successful Suit Against Secondary Actors Is Still Possible, 40
SETON HALL L. REV. 1811, 1822 (2010) (citing Simpson v. AOL Time Warner
Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom. Simpson v.
Homestore.com, Inc., 519 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2008)). The court in Simpson stated:
[T]o be liable as a primary violator of § 10(b) for participation in a
“scheme to defraud,” the defendant must have engaged in conduct that
had the principal purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of
fact in furtherance of the scheme. It is not enough that a transaction in
which a defendant was involved had a deceptive purpose and effect; the
defendant's own conduct contributing to the transaction or overall
scheme must have had a deceptive purpose and effect.
Id. at 1048.
54. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 156; Maynard, supra note 50, at 568. Court
of appeals decisions were in conflict regarding whether an injured investor could
rely on Section 10(b) to recover damages from a party who neither made a
public misstatement nor violated a duty to disclose but did participate in the
scheme that violated Section 10(b). Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 156. The Eighth
Circuit found that a plaintiff could not establish reliance if the secondary actor
did not issue a statement to the public. Maynard, supra note 50, at 568 (citing In
re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006)). Counter
to the Eighth Circuit’s holding, the Ninth Circuit found that reliance could be
established if the misstatement’s introduction into the securities market “was the
intended end result of a scheme to misrepresent revenue.” Id. (quoting Simpson
v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated sub nom.
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As in Central Bank, Justice Kennedy wrote the majority
opinion.55 In its decision, the Court rejected Stoneridge’s schemeliability theory.56 Citing the outside investors’ lack of reliance, the
majority found that neither Scientific-Atlanta nor Motorola could
be liable in a 10b-5 private class action.57 As the Court noted,
reliance is essential to the 10b-5 private action.58 During the
relevant time period, no public investor had knowledge of
Scientific-Atlanta’s or Motorola’s deceptive conduct.59 Charter
deceived its auditors and filed the financial statements, not
Scientific-Atlanta or Motorola.60 Nothing Scientific-Atlanta or
Motorola did led to the necessary or inevitable consequence that
Charter would record the transactions in the way that it did.61 Thus,
their acts were too remote to establish reliance.62 Stoneridge
unsuccessfully argued that reliance could be established because
issuance of Charter’s deceptive financial statements was the
natural consequence of Scientific-Atlanta’s and Motorola’s
fraudulent conduct.63 However, the Court found this causal
progression too remote and indirect to impose liability.64
Accordingly, neither Scientific-Atlanta nor Motorola were liable
for their blatant and unconscionable fraudulent conduct.65
As in Central Bank, the Court took certain steps to limit the
reach of its decision. To avoid any misconception that Stoneridge
established an oral or written statement requirement, the majority
emphasized that conduct itself can be deceptive and can be the
basis for imposing liability in a 10b-5 private action.66 Thus,
Stoneridge began to clarify the line between primary and

Simpson v. Homestore.com, Inc., 519 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2008)). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 156.
55. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
166 (1994); Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 151.
56. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159–64.
57. Id. at 159.
58. See id. The Court used the phrase “§10(b) private cause of action,”
which is the same thing as the private Rule 10b-5 cause of action. Id. See also
discussion supra note 23 (regarding elements of the Rule 10b-5 private action).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 161.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 160.
64. See id. at 159.
65. See id. at 160; Murdock, supra note 35, at 196.
66. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159.
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secondary aiding-and-abetting liability.67 After Stoneridge, it
appears that if a plaintiff is attacking a material misstatement, then
the defendant needs to “make” that statement for liability to be
imposed in a 10b-5 private action and not simply aid in a behindthe-scenes scheme resulting in the statement’s dissemination. This
of course leads to the obvious question: Who actually “makes” a
statement under Rule 10b-5? Unlike the 14-year delay between
Central Bank and Stoneridge, the financial and legal community
would have to wait a mere two years for the Court to clarify the
meaning of make under Rule 10b-5 and, as a result of this
clarification, to further limit the effectiveness of the 10b-5 private
action as a fraud-deterrence mechanism.
II. THE JANUS DECISION
A. Majority and Dissenting Opinions
1. Background Facts
The Supreme Court in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders confronted the question of whether a closelyrelated investment advisor could be liable in a 10b-5 private action
for false statements that it incorporated into its client’s mutual fund
prospectuses.68 Janus Capital Group, Inc. (Janus Capital) created a
family of mutual funds known as the Janus Investment Fund
(JIF).69 JIF was a separate legal entity that investors entirely
owned.70 JIF retained Janus Capital Management (JCM), a whollyowned subsidiary of Janus Capital, to be its investment advisor.71
At all relevant times, JCM and JIF were closely connected.72 Every
JIF employee was also a JCM officer, and all of JIF’s officers were
vice presidents of JCM.73 Yet, because only a single JIF board
member was associated with JCM, JIF had the requisite
independence for a mutual fund.74

67. WILLIAM O. FISHER, VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING
NEGOTIATION *36–39 (2011), available at Westlaw VCPON CH 36 S 5 D.
68. 131 S. Ct. 2296.
69. Id. at 2299.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 2306.
73. Id. at 2306, 2312.
74. See id. at 2299. According to the relevant federal statute, 60% of a
mutual fund’s board of directors can be comprised of “interested persons.” 15
U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2006).
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Nonetheless, when the substance of the relationship between a
mutual fund and its investment advisor is scrutinized, it appears
doubtful that JIF and JCM were truly independent. In a mutual
fund, the investment advisor establishes the fund’s structure.75 The
advisor acts as the operational life-support system for the mutual
fund, providing it with substantially all of its management and
business infrastructure.76 Ordinarily, the investment advisor
appoints the mutual fund’s board of trustees, who, as a result,
consistently retains him to manage the fund.77 Combining these
realities regarding investment advisors with the relationship
between JIF and JCM, it seems that any conclusion that JIF and
JCM were independent is based more on form and technicalities
rather than the actual substance of their relationship.
Acting through its officers, JCM managed the mutual funds’
investments; prepared, modified, and implemented long-term
strategies; and conducted day-to-day activities.78 As required by
federal law, JIF had to issue and file prospectuses outlining both
strategy and operations for each mutual fund.79 JCM’s employees
drafted and reviewed the prospectuses and distributed them
through the Janus Capital website.80 Yet, it was JIF who was
credited with filing the prospectuses.81 Interestingly, because all
JIF employees were also JCM officers, it was actually JCM
officers who filed the JIF prospectuses.82 These prospectuses stated
that several of the JIF mutual funds were not meant for market
timing and could have been interpreted to represent that JCM
would establish rules to restrain the market timing practice.83
75. William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline: A Behavioral Approach
to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 69 (2010).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 70. A board of trustees is another name for a mutual fund’s board
of directors. Frequently Asked Questions About Mutual Fund Directors, INV.
CO. INST., http://www.ici.org/pubs/faqs/ci.faq_fund_gov_idc.idc (last visited
Oct. 26, 2012).
78. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2306.
79. Id. at 2300.
80. Id. at 2312.
81. Id. at 2304.
82. See id. at 2306.
83. Id. at 2300. According to the court in Janus:
Market timing is a trading strategy that exploits time delay in mutual
funds’ daily valuation system. The price for buying or selling shares of
a mutual fund is ordinarily determined by the next net asset value
(NAV) calculation after the order is placed. The NAV calculation
usually happens once a day, at the close of the major U.S. markets.
Because of certain time delays, however, the values used in these
calculations do not always accurately reflect the true value of the
underlying assets. For example, a fund may value its foreign securities
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However, these statements were not entirely truthful. In a
subsequent complaint filed against both Janus Capital and JCM,
the New York Attorney General alleged that Janus Capital secretly
entered into agreements to permit market timing in numerous
mutual funds run by JCM, contrary to the previous statements in
the prospectuses.84
After the Attorney General filed the complaint, numerous
investors withdrew their money from JIF.85 As JIF’s investment
advisor, JCM received compensation from JIF proportionate to the
total value of the mutual funds.86 This compensation made up a
large portion of Janus Capital’s income.87 Consequently, due to
JIF’s losses, Janus Capital and its investors suffered financial
harm.88 As a result, Janus Capital stockholders, represented by
First Derivate Traders, filed a class action lawsuit against Janus
Capital and JCM.89
In its complaint, First Derivative Traders averred that both
Janus Capital and JCM materially misled investors through
statements contained in the prospectuses.90 Initially, the Maryland
District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.91
The district court absolved Janus Capital of liability because it did
not “make” the misstatements.92 On the other hand, the court found
based on the price at the close of the foreign market, which may have
occurred several hours before the calculation. But events might have
taken place after the close of the foreign market that could be expected
to affect their price. If the event were expected to increase the price of
the foreign securities, a market-timing investor could buy shares of a
mutual fund at the artificially low NAV and sell the next day when the
NAV corrects itself upward.
Id. at 2300 n.1 (citing Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective
Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 68 Fed. Reg. 70402 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239 and 274)). “Although market timing is
legal, it harms other investors in the mutual fund.” Id. at 2300. Because it is
currently a legal practice, one of the few ways to prevent market timing is for
the mutual fund to institute policies and procedures against it, which is what
JCM implied it was doing in the prospectuses. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. See also Birdthistle, supra note 75, at 70. The investment advisor’s
fee is a percentage of the underlying mutual fund assets. Birdthistle, supra note
75, at 69.
87. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 2301.
91. Id. (citing In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d 618, 620 (D.
Md. 2007), rev’d, 566 F.3d 111, 121 (4th Cir. 2009)).
92. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 622.
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that JCM did “make” the misstatements, but it could not be liable
to Janus Capital’s shareholders because it did not actually purchase
any mutual fund shares.93 The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that
both Janus Capital and JCM did “make” the misleading statements
by participating in the writing and dissemination of the
prospectuses.94 The Supreme Court granted writs specifically to
determine whether JCM “made” the misstatements and thus could
be liable in a 10b-5 private action for the misstatements regarding
market timing.95
2. Majority Reasoning
The majority absolved JCM of liability because it did not
“make” the material misstatements in the prospectuses.96 Writing
for the majority, Justice Thomas relied on the Oxford English
Dictionary to show that the phrase “to make any . . . statement”
was approximately equivalent to the phrase “to state.”97
Concluding that the meaning of make was unambiguous,98 the
majority ruled that “[f]or purposes of Rule 10b–5, the maker of a
statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the
statement, including its content and whether and how to
communicate it.”99 Individuals or entities without ultimate control
can only give suggestions regarding a statement; they cannot
actually “make” the statement.100 Furthermore, “attribution within
a statement or implicit from surrounding circumstances is strong
evidence that a statement was made by––and only by––the party to
whom it is attributed.”101 According to Justice Thomas, JIF, and
not JCM, did “make” the misstatements because JIF solely bore
the obligation to file the prospectuses and because it was the party
that filed them.102
93. Id. at 624.
94. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301 (quoting In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d
111, 121 (4th Cir. 2009)).
95. See id. Despite finding that Janus Capital did “make” the misstatements,
the Fourth Circuit determined that Janus Capital could only be liable under
Section 20(a) for being a “control person” of JCM. Id. As a result, they were not
involved in the case upon it reaching the Supreme Court.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2302.
98. Id. at 2303 n.8.
99. Id. at 2302.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2304–05. However, it was truly JCM officers who filed the
prospectuses because every employee of JIF was a JCM officer. See discussion
supra Part II.A.1.

646

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

To emphasize the point, Justice Thomas analogized the
situation to the relationship between a speaker and a
speechwriter.103 The speechwriter drafts the speech, but the
speaker has ultimate control over its content and bears ultimate
responsibility for what is said.104 According to the Court, its
definition of make followed from its prior holdings in Central
Bank and Stoneridge.105 The majority found that there would be no
distinction between primary violators and those who aid and abet if
they adopted a broader view of make to include persons or entities
lacking ultimate authority over a statement.106 In the majority’s
view, the dissent’s argument for a broader definition would
undercut Central Bank because a broader definition would
eliminate most of the distinction between primary and secondary
aiding-and-abetting liability.107 Turning its attention to Stoneridge,
the Court focused on its language that the defendants could not be
liable because their actions did not make it necessary or inevitable
that Charter would record the transactions in the way it did.108 In
its opinion, the Janus majority’s definition of make flowed from
Stoneridge, because only with ultimate authority over a statement’s
content and means of communication does it become necessary
and inevitable that a misrepresentation will appear in the
statement.109 Finally, in an attempt to remove any uncertainty
regarding the definition, the Court rejected the Government’s
argument that make is the equivalent of create.110 Therefore,
despite JCM’s substantial involvement in creating and distributing
the prospectuses, JCM did not “make” the material misstatements
because JIF actually controlled the content and distribution of the
prospectuses.111 Effectively, JCM was the speechwriter, and JIF
was the speaker.112
3. Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Breyer argued that both language and
precedent prove that numerous individuals can make a statement
that appears in a firm’s prospectus, even though the board of
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 2302.
Id.
Id. at 2302–03.
Id. at 2302.
See id. at 2302 n.6.
Id. at 2303.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2305.
Id.
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directors has ultimate control over its content.113 Thus, JCM should
have been liable for making the material misstatements
incorporated into the prospectuses.114
To refute the rigid boundaries that the majority imposed,
Justice Breyer relied on everyday examples to argue that an
individual can “make” a statement even if he is not the person with
ultimate authority.115 For example, cabinet officials regularly make
statements on subjects over which the president has ultimate
authority under the Constitution.116 Similarly, company employees
make statements over which other individuals within the
corporation have control.117
Additionally, the dissent asserted that the majority incorrectly
relied on Central Bank and Stoneridge.118 Central Bank dealt with
secondary aiding-and-abetting liability, whereas Janus involved
primary liability.119 According to Justice Breyer, the majority’s
rule extended Central Bank to new and rejected territory.120
Furthermore, he argued that Stoneridge was distinguishable from
Janus.121 The Stoneridge Court analyzed whether investors could
rely on Scientific-Atlanta’s and Motorola’s behind-the-scenes
actions.122 In Justice Breyer’s opinion, that was a much different
inquiry than the Janus majority’s evaluation concerning whether a
particular actor “makes” a material misstatement.123
Finally, the dissent recognized a potential problem with Janus:
the fact that, in certain situations, neither corporate officers
composing the statements nor the corporation’s board of directors
can be held liable in a 10b-5 private action.124 This is one of the
problems arising from separating the person that “makes” the
statement from the person who actually drafts it knowing it to be
false. If the speechwriter drafts the statement knowing that it is
false and the innocent speaker delivers it under the belief that it is
true, the speaker will be the person who “makes” the statement
under Janus. However, because the speaker lacks any knowledge
regarding the statement’s falsity, will courts be willing to impute
113. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
114. See id.
115. Id. at 2307.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 2307–10.
119. See id. at 2307–08.
120. See id. at 2308. Janus is doing precisely what Central Bank claimed it
was not doing: immunizing secondary actors. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
121. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2308–09 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122. See id.
123. See id. at 2309–10.
124. Id. at 2310.
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the speechwriter’s scienter to the speaker?125 In Justice Breyer’s
opinion, both parties could escape liability in this scenario, which
seems to imply that he believes that courts will not impute the
speechwriter’s scienter to the officer.126
B. Critique of the Janus Majority’s Reasoning
1. Potential Absolution of Corporate Officers
The Janus majority has made it possible for corporate officers
and other corporate agents to escape liability for deliberately
fraudulent actions.127 In Janus, the Supreme Court held that “the
maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority
over the statement.”128 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the
attribution of a statement, whether express or implicit, “is strong
evidence that a statement was made by––and only by––the party to
whom it is attributed.”129 Additionally, the majority explicitly
rejected the SEC’s argument that equated make with create, stating
that this would be inconsistent with precedent.130 Combined, these
legal assertions could lead to disastrous results. Potentially,
corporate officers and agents could escape liability for their
fraudulent actions in creating and distributing a material
misstatement to the public, so long as that misstatement is
attributed to the corporation rather than to the agents and officers
personally.
While it is true that this attribution presumption could be
overcome, the plaintiff would still need to prove that the person––
to whom the statement was not attributed––was “the person or
entity with ultimate authority” over it.131 Justice Thomas gives no
indication regarding what he means by “ultimate authority.”132
However, in absolving JCM of liability, he does imply that “the
person or entity with ultimate authority” is the person or entity
with formal control over the statement rather than the person or
125. See discussion supra note 37 (regarding scienter).
126. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127. While an argument can be made that Janus’s definition of make should
be limited to cases involving legally separate entities, at least one court has
acknowledged that nothing in Janus limits the language to just those cases; thus,
it can be applied to corporate insiders. See Haw. Ironworkers Annuity Trust
Fund v. Cole, 2011 WL 3862206, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011).
128. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2303.
131. Id. at 2302.
132. Id.
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entity with substantive control. Based on the facts of Janus, as well
as the nature of the relationship between an investment advisor and
a mutual fund, JCM had substantive control over JIF and thus had
ultimate authority over JIF’s statements.133 Nonetheless, Justice
Thomas focused on the fact that JCM and JIF were formally
independent because only a single JIF director was associated with
JCM.134 In his opinion, because JIF was a separate legal entity,
JCM did not “make” the misstatements contained in the
prospectuses because JCM did not have ultimate control over
them.135 Therefore, based on the majority’s opinion, “ultimate
authority” should be viewed as synonymous with formal authority.
It will be a rare case when a corporate officer will be deemed
to have “ultimate authority” over a statement that is not attributed
to him. In a corporation, “the board of directors is the ultimate
decision-making body.”136 Thus, under the plain language of
Janus, the board of directors would always be the entity with
ultimate authority over any statements issued by the company
because it is “the ultimate decision-making body” and has formal
authority over the corporation and its officers.137 Even if, in reality,
the officer has control over the statement due to his experience and
position within his company, the Janus majority appears unwilling
to look past formal control when determining which person or
entity has ultimate authority over a statement. Consequently,
Janus’s plain language does not leave open the possibility for
corporate officers to “make” statements that are not attributed to
them because the board of directors has formal authority over all
officers and all statements.
The majority’s opinion effectively rejects the Court’s analysis
in Central Bank. In Central Bank, the Court stated that secondary
actors could still be primarily liable for their actions, just not
responsible for secondary aiding-and-abetting liability.138 Yet, after
133. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
134. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
135. See id. at 2304–05.
136. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 290 (1999) (citing Robert C. Clark, Agency
Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF
BUSINESS 56 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)). Additionally,
the board of directors is generally characterized as “the corporation.” Id. (citing
Clark, supra, at 56).
137. See id.
138. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. The Court in Central Bank found that
the 10b-5 private action could not impose aiding-and-abetting liability on
secondary actors. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511
U.S. 164, 183 (1994). Yet, secondary actors could still be primarily liable for
violating Rule 10b-5. Id. at 191.
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Janus, this is no longer the case. It is true that secondary actors
could still be primarily liable for disseminated misstatements, if
those statements are attributed to them. However, for all practical
purposes, secondary actors will never be liable for the fraudulent
statements that they construct because after Janus, no corporate
officers will be foolish enough to voluntarily attribute a statement
to themselves. Instead, all statements will be credited to the
company, and the corporate officers who actually perpetrate the
fraud will escape liability under Rule 10b-5.
Nevertheless, the Janus majority’s definition of make and its
statement regarding attribution are consistent with the Stoneridge
holding regarding reliance. The Supreme Court in Stoneridge
refused to impose liability on both Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola
because no investors had knowledge of their unseen fraudulent
acts, and thus no investor could show reliance on their fraudulent
conduct.139 If a corporate officer issues an unattributed statement,
no one will have knowledge of his behind-the-scenes fraudulent
acts; rather, investors will only be aware of the disseminated
statement that is attributed to the company. Additionally, unless
the person has ultimate authority over the statements, his actions
do not make it necessary and inevitable that a statement will be
written or disseminated in a particular manner.140
However, consistency with Stoneridge does not erase the
problems with the Janus decision. Consider the following
hypothetical: A corporate officer, who has been working for
several months on closing one of the company’s operating
divisions, composes a press release to deny that the company has
any plans to do so. The release states that the company has no
future plans to close any divisions. The officer does not attribute
the press release to himself. The statement is attributed solely to
the corporation. One week later, the company closes its most
profitable operating division and lays off hundreds of workers.
Later, the media discovers that the company had been planning to
close this division for over a year. After a precipitous drop in the
company’s stock value, investors file a 10b-5 private class action
against the corporation.
Taking Janus at face value, only the corporation is liable for
the material misstatements, not the officer who created them. The
press release was attributed to only the corporation, not the
corporate officer, and attribution is strong evidence that the

139. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
140. See id.
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statement was only made by the entity to which it is attributed.141
The corporation has ultimate responsibility over the statement and
whether to issue it, and the corporation would be the only party
that made the misstatement under Rule 10b-5, based on the plain
language of Janus.142
Furthermore, scholars have already recognized that Janus’s
attribution language is a distinct problem. In a hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, James Cox, Professor of Law at Duke
University, acknowledged that, under Janus, statements are made
only by the corporate entity, as opposed to any of the innumerable
individuals who review a statement before it is issued.143 Similarly,
Joseph Franco, law professor at Suffolk University Law School,
pointed out that even the person who drafts a disclosure with
knowledge of its falsity will not be primarily liable for fraud, as
long as another person distributes the disclosure in his own
name.144

141. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296,
2302 (2011).
142. The board of directors––which is generally characterized as “the
corporation”—is the “ultimate decision-making body,” and consequently has
ultimate authority over all statements issued by the corporation. See Blair &
Stout, supra note 136, at 290 (citing Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus
Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 56
(John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985)).
143. See Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court's
Recent Rulings Will Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary
Comm., 112th Cong. 77 (2011) (statement of James Cox, Brainerd Currie
Professor of Law at Duke University Law School) (“[F]inancial reports pass
through multiple individuals, each of which provides the voice to the inanimate
corporate entity. The reasoning of Janus Capital is that none of these actors
makes a statement as the statement can only be understood to have been made
by the entity, which, of course, is powerless to make any statement.”).
144. Joseph A. Franco, Of Complicity and Compliance: A Rules-Based AntiComplicity Strategy Under Federal Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 59
(2011). In his article, Franco argues:
Thus, according to the majority, merely drafting a false disclosure with
knowledge of its falsity and subsequently deceiving another into
believing that the statement is accurate, does not alone make an
individual primarily liable for fraud, so long as the other person
disseminates the statement in its own name. In trying to distinguish
primary liability and aiding and abetting, the Court has actually crafted
a rule insulating from liability those who in fact may be primarily
responsible.
Id. at 59. When a corporate officer creates a statement attributed to the company,
which is subsequently issued in the company’s name, that officer will escape
liability under Janus’s formalistic test because the other legal person (the
company) issued the statement in its own name. See id.
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2. Subsequent Lower Court Decisions
a. In re Merck & Co., Inc. Securities, Derivative & “ERISA”
Litigation
Almost immediately after Janus, lower courts began to
interpret and apply it.145 In In re Merck & Co., stockowners sued
Merck and its executives for alleged overstatements regarding the
commercial viability of the medication Vioxx.146 The plaintiffs
alleged that Merck downplayed the potential link between the
medication and increased health risks, despite substantial evidence
confirming the link.147 Plaintiffs joined Edward Scolnick, the
former Executive Vice President of Merck, as an individual
defendant.148 The plaintiffs credited seven public misstatements
regarding Vioxx to Scolnick.149 In defense, Scolnick argued that
even though the statements were attributed to him, he could not be
liable for them because the plaintiffs failed to allege that he
possessed ultimate authority over those statements.150 In Scolnick’s
opinion, Janus established that attribution was necessary but not
sufficient by itself for a 10b-5 claim.151 In essence, Scolnick
argued that something in addition to attribution was required under
Janus. The court found that Scolnick did “make” the attributed,
public misstatements.152 Scolnick made each misstatement
pursuant to his authority as a Merck officer.153 According to the
court, Janus did not change the rule that a corporation can only act
through its agents.154 The court then stated:
[Janus] certainly cannot be read to restrict liability for Rule
10b-5 claims against corporate officers to instances in which
a plaintiff can plead, and ultimately prove, that those
officers—as opposed to the corporation itself—had
“ultimate authority” over the statement. Yet, this is the
premise that underlies Scolnick’s argument that he may not
be liable for statements actually attributed to him. Taken to
145. In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 2011 WL
3444199 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011).
146. Id. at *1.
147. See id.
148. Id. at *1 n.1, *25.
149. See id. at *23.
150. See id. at *24.
151. See id. at *25.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id. (quoting Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank,
250 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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its logical conclusion, Scolnick’s position would absolve
corporate officers of primary liability for all Rule 10b-5
claims, because ultimately, the statements are within the
control of the corporation which employs them.155
Unlike Janus, the court in In re Merck & Co. dealt with
statements actually attributed to the corporate officer. Nevertheless,
the district court appeared to acknowledge that it would refuse to
apply any interpretation of Janus that completely absolves corporate
officers of liability for their fraudulent acts. The court balked at
adopting Scolnick’s argument because it would “absolve corporate
officers of primary liability for all Rule 10b-5 claims.”156
b. City of Roseville Employees’ Retirement System v.
EnergySolutions, Inc.
In another post-Janus decision, City of Roseville Employees’
Retirement System v. EnergySolutions, Inc., the New York
Southern District Court looked at which of the defendants made
certain statements contained in registration statements.157 The
plaintiffs alleged causes of action against EnergySolutions, Inc.
(ES), twelve of ES’s officers and directors, and ENV Holdings,
Inc. (ENV), ES’s parent company.158 The plaintiffs alleged that the
registration statements filed by ES contained numerous false and
misleading statements and that each defendant made the
misstatements.159 After citing Janus, specifically its language
regarding attribution, the court ruled that ES and the defendants
who actually signed the registration statements clearly made the
misstatements.160 The court absolved two of the other individual
defendants for three primary reasons: (1) they did not sign the
statements; (2) they were not directors in ES at the time the
registration statements were filed; and (3) they did not have
authority over the registration statements’ content.161
The court’s final evaluation focused on ENV, which was the
sole owner of ES.162 ENV was solely owned by the “Sponsors and

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys. v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 814 F.
Supp. 2d 395, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
158. See id. at 401, 407.
159. See id. at 403−04.
160. Id. at 417.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Management” (sponsors).163 Similar to the entities in Janus, ES
and ENV were distinct legal entities that shared the same
individuals in key management positions.164 However, unlike
Janus, the registration statements specified that the sponsors would
control ES and that they controlled all matters requiring
shareholder approval.165 The sponsors controlled ES through ENV,
which meant that ENV had ultimate authority over ES’s actions.166
Despite ENV not signing the registration statements, the court
found that ENV did “make” the misstatements due to their control
over ES.167 As the court concluded:
Here, where the Registration Statements contain so many
indicia of control, the lack of an explicit statement that
ENV was speaking through the Registration Statements
does not control the answer to the question of whether it
made those statements. A reasonable jury could find that,
on the facts alleged here, ENVs role went well beyond that
of “a speechwriter draft[ing] a speech,” because, with
regard to ES’s sales of shares owned by ENV, ENV had
control over the content of the message, the underlying
subject matter of the message, and the ultimate decision of
whether to communicate the message.168
Overall, City of Roseville should not be surprising. The court
found that both ES and the other signing defendants did “make”
the misstatements.169 Clearly, by signing the statements, ES and
the individuals attributed the statements to themselves. The
potential shock in City of Roseville results from the court also
holding ENV liable for the misstatements.170 However, this, too,
should not be surprising based on the language in Janus. The Court
in Janus stated that the person or entity who “makes” a statement
is “the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement,
including its content and whether and how to communicate it.”171
Based on this language, ENV doomed themselves through the
declarations contained in ES’s registration statements, specifically
163. Id. “Sponsors and Management” is the exact language contained in ES’s
registration statement from November 2007. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 418.
167. Id.
168. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
169. See id. at 417.
170. See id. at 418.
171. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296,
2302 (2011).
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the statements regarding how the sponsors controlled ES.172
Because the sponsors owned 100% of ENV, and ENV owned
100% of ES, ENV controlled ES and thus would have ultimate
authority over the registration statements issued by ES.173
Therefore, using the language from Janus, ENV did “make” the
misstatements because it was the person or entity with ultimate
control over ES’s statements.
Despite these prior rulings, nothing prevents other federal
courts from using an interpretation of Janus that completely
absolves corporate officers of liability. Lower courts can interpret
Supreme Court decisions in vastly different ways.174 Hence, at this
point in time, determining what lower courts will do is extremely
difficult. Although one cannot predict all of the potential negative
consequences of the Janus opinion’s attribution language, the
majority’s reasoning clearly leaves open the possibility for farreaching problems.
3. Examples of Janus’s Impact
Despite the potential for Janus to absolve corporate officers
from liability, there are certain situations in which it is clear that an
officer would “make” a statement. For instance, if a company
officer signs a statement, he would be attributing the statement to
himself, and thus he is deemed to “make” that statement, based on
Janus.175
A more complicated example involves a corporate officer
verbalizing a prepared statement at a press conference. If the
officer explicitly states that he is speaking solely for the
corporation in his capacity as an officer, it is unlikely that a court
could hold him liable as a maker of the statements, even if the
172. City of Roseville, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 418.
173. See id.
174. See Todd G. Cosenza, Applying Stoneridge to Restrict Secondary Actor
Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 64 BUS. LAW. 59, 60 (2008). The ability for lower
courts to interpret Supreme Court precedent in vastly different ways was evident
in the aftermath of Stoneridge. After the Court rendered Stoneridge, the
Pennsylvania Eastern District Court, pursuant to the decision, absolved a law
firm that was deeply involved in preparing and advising a company on its public
disclosures but whose name did not appear on the fraudulent disclosures. See id.
(citing In re DVI Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196 (E.D. Pa. 2008)). However,
contrary to the Pennsylvania court’s holding, the California Eastern District
Court imposed liability on a law firm that played a substantial role in composing
a fraudulent disclosure despite no public identification of the firm. See id. (citing
Lopes v. Vieira, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2008)).
175. This is the same situation found in City of Roseville. See City of
Roseville, 814 F. Supp. 2d 395.
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officer fraudulently constructed the statements. This would be the
corporation’s statement, not the officer’s statement. The
corporation would be “the person or entity with ultimate authority
over the statement,” which means it would be the maker of the
statement under Rule 10b-5.176
Some may view the officer in this scenario as the speaker and
speechwriter within Justice Thomas’ speaker–speechwriter
analogy.177 However, this is not the case. If the officer created the
statement, then clearly he would be the speechwriter within the
analogy. Yet, he is not also the speaker. When giving the
statement, the officer is speaking on behalf of the corporation, not
on behalf of himself. The corporation is the speaker, and the
officer is simply representing the corporation. As legal entities,
corporations can only act through their officers and agents.178
Justice Thomas’s speaker–speechwriter analogy presumes two
autonomous individuals, who each can act for themselves.179 A
corporation is not an entity that can act for itself.180 Instead, it must
act through others.181 The officer in this scenario is actually the
mouthpiece of the company, which means that the company is still
the speaker within the analogy.
However, what if the officer goes on to take questions from the
press and provides unscripted answers? Under Janus, a court
would likely still absolve the corporate officer of liability. When a
corporate officer speaks on the company’s behalf, he is speaking
with the company’s authority, and the company’s instructions and
information are shaping what he is saying. In other words, the
corporate officer, despite the statement being unscripted, is still
giving a statement that is ultimately within the control of and
attributed to the company. Looking at this entire situation, it is
almost comical that the officer could escape liability. Essentially,
the officer would be arguing that he did not actually “make” the
statements that, in common parlance, he made to the public. This is
just one situation demonstrating the outrageousness of Janus.
Perhaps the greatest impact of the Janus decision will be its
effect on the corporate press release. For a large corporation,
issuing a press release will typically involve many individuals
176. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296,
2302 (2011).
177. Id.
178. See In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 2011
WL 3444199, at *25 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011).
179. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
180. See id.
181. See id.
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looking at and revising it prior to distribution.182 What if one of
those individuals puts a particular statement in it that he knows is
false? Each individual officer will not sign the press release.
Rather, the statement will be attributed to the corporation as a
whole. Because the statement is not attributed to any particular
corporate officer, but rather to the corporation as a whole, the
corporation would be the maker of that statement. Under Janus,
attribution “is strong evidence that a statement was made by—and
only by—the party to whom it is attributed.”183 Additionally, even
though attribution may only be a rebuttable presumption of who
“makes” a statement, it is unlikely that a corporate officer will be
viewed as the individual with “ultimate authority” over a statement
that is not attributed to him.184 Thus, the perpetrating officer will
likely escape liability for his fraudulent actions, and the
corporation and its shareholders will be left bearing the financial
burden for the officer’s unlawful acts. As is evident by these
examples, outside of situations in which either the officer cannot
legally escape attribution or the officer unintentionally attributes
the statement to himself, the Janus decision will absolve corporate
officers and other agents from liability for their fraudulent
statements because they would not be the makers of those
statements.
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF JANUS
A. Janus Contradicts the Deterrence Function of the Private 10b-5
Right of Action
Janus undercuts the use of the Rule 10b-5 private action as a
deterrent to fraudulent conduct. When discussing the Rule 10b-5
private action, commentators generally provide two policy
rationales for its existence: compensation and deterrence.185
However, the 10b-5 private action should not be viewed as a
compensation tool. Whether from judgments or settlements, the
vast majority of compensation paid to investors is actually funded
by the investors themselves.186 Accordingly, securities litigation
182. Allowing one person, without any supervision, to issue an important
press release would clearly be an unreasonable corporate procedure.
183. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
184. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
185. E.g., John A. MacKerron, The Price Integrity Cause of Action Under
Rule 10b-5: Limiting and Expanding the Use of the Fraud on the Market
Theory, 69 OR. L. REV. 177, 183–84 (1990).
186. Travis S. Souza, Comment, Freedom to Defraud: Stoneridge, Primary
Liability, and the Need to Properly Define Section 10(b), 57 DUKE L.J. 1179,
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mostly involves moving money from some investors to pay other
investors, a result sometimes referred to as “robbing Peter to pay
Paul.”187 Money will shift from the current investors to those
investors who purchased stock in the affected period.188 Typically,
the investors who suffer are those long-term investors who still
own shares in the company, while the short-term speculators
benefit as a result of their coincidental purchase of shares during
the relevant time period.189 The short-term speculators will escape
with the damages awarded to them, whereas the long-term
investors who recover will have their damages netted out by the
contemporaneous payment of damages and decrease in stock
price.190 Securities litigation tends to result in investors simply
having to bear their own losses, which is inconsistent with a
purported goal of compensation.191 Justice White echoed this
anticompensation sentiment in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.192 In his
dissent, Justice White advocated against using 10b-5 for
compensatory purposes when he stated that the Securities
Exchange Act did not support a conversion of Rule 10b-5 into “a
scheme of investor’s insurance.”193
Instead, the main purpose for the 10b-5 private action should
be its prophylactic effect of deterring corporations and corporate
officers from engaging in fraudulent conduct.194 Through holding
culpable actors liable and imposing a financial burden on them,
those actors and other similarly situated individuals are less likely

1201 (2008) (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action:
An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation 7, 14–15 (Columbia Law Sch.
Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 293, 2006), available at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/WP293?exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id
=941958&showthumb=0)).
187. Id.; Adam Reiser, Note, Compensating Defrauded Investors While
Preserving the SEC’s Mission of Deterrence: A Call for Congress to Counteract
the Troubling Consequences of Stoneridge, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 257, 264 (2009).
188. Souza, supra note 186, at 1202.
189. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 262 (1988) (White, J.,
dissenting); see also Richard A. Booth, The End of Securities Fraud Class
Action?, 29 REG. 46, 50 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 917393
(discussing how, in a securities fraud class action, wealth transfers from “buyand-hold investors” to “stock-picking traders”).
190. See Souza, supra note 186, at 1201; Booth, supra note 189, at 50.
191. Souza, supra note 186, at 1203.
192. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 252 (White, J., dissenting).
193. Id.
194. Sirkin, supra note 9, at 311.
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to commit fraud in the future.195 Because people consistently act
for their self-interest, an individual who knows that he could
potentially bear financial responsibility for his conduct is likely to
refrain from engaging in fraudulent conduct in order to avoid the
negative consequences.196 Compensating investors should only be
used as a means to further the 10b-5 private action’s primary goal
of deterring fraud by holding corporations and officers financially
responsible for their fraudulent acts.
Despite Rule 10b-5’s main value being its prophylactic effects,
the Court’s holding in Janus eliminates much of its deterrence
function. A system that absolves actors from possible liability
removes much of the disincentive to engaging in fraudulent
conduct.197 Post-Janus, even actors, such as corporate officers who
write the fraudulent statements and have them distributed, can
escape liability under the 10b-5 private action as long as the issued
statements are not attributed to them.198 Due to this ability to
escape liability, corporate officers could be more inclined to
engage in fraudulent conduct in order to realize some of the
beneficial effects of fraud, such as a potential short-term increase
in stock prices through erroneous statements issued to the public.
For example, as long as the misstatements are not attributed to
him, an officer can realize the short-term gains through selling his
stock, without any personal liability under a 10b-5 private action.
After Janus, corporate officers will no longer make the mistake of
attributing statements to themselves, unlike the defendant in In re
195. Souza, supra note 186, at 1203 (citing Donald C. Langevoort, Capping
Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 651–52
(1996)).
196. Claire Andre & Manuel Velasquez, Unmasking the Motives of the Good
Samaritan, SANTA CLARA UNIV., http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/
v2n1/samaritan.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
197. See Siamas, supra note 27, at 917 (“Imposing liability only on those
who make public misrepresentations . . . encourages concealment and subterfuge
rather than conformity to the intent of the Acts.”); Maynard, supra note 50, at
579 (“Knowing that they are not liable in private suits, companies will engage in
a decision-making calculus not unlike the taxpayer who decides whether to lie
on his income tax statement.”); Mark Klock, Comment, What Will It Take to
Label Participation in a Deceptive Scheme to Defraud Buyers of Securities a
Violation of Section 10(b)? The Disastrous Result and Reasoning of Stoneridge,
58 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 341 (2010) (citing Stuart Sinai, Stoneridge––Escape
from Securities Liability Notwithstanding Active, Intentional, Deceptive
Conduct, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 170, 187 (2008)) (“If players in financial markets
are always given the benefit of the doubt when they engage in questionable
activities which are not clearly illegal, then financial market participants are
effectively being encouraged with economic incentives to engage in shady
conduct.”).
198. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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Merck.199 Therefore, through the narrow definition of make that
Janus provides, the Supreme Court has destroyed the effectiveness
of the 10b-5 action as a fraud-deterrence mechanism.
B. Ineffectiveness of SEC Enforcement Action
The Supreme Court’s decision in Janus could also affect the
SEC’s ability to impose aiding-and-abetting liability through the
SEC enforcement action. In order for the SEC to pursue aidingand-abetting liability, there must be a primary violation of Rule
10b-5.200 However, in certain situations, there may be no primary
violation. Under Janus, the corporation is considered to “make”
the statements that are attributed to it, whereas the corporate
officer who actually composed the statement does not “make” it.201
However, often only the corporate officer knows the statement is
deceptive, whereas the corporation’s board of directors is
completely in the dark. Will courts be willing to impute the
officer’s knowledge to the corporation and its board of
directors?202 Currently, no definitive theory regarding imputing
scienter to a corporate defendant exists.203 Yet, it appears that if a
single officer possesses the fraudulent intent and writes the
statement, the court will impute his scienter to the corporation.204
However, in his dissent, Justice Breyer acknowledged that, as a
result of the Janus majority’s opinion, there could be a situation
where no one would be liable: neither the guilty officers because
they did not “make” the misstatement, nor the innocent board of
directors who did not know of the misstatement. It is unlikely that
Justice Breyer is implying that courts will not impute officers’
scienter to their corporation. But, his statements in Janus do raise
199. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.ii.
200. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (Supp. V 2011).
201. See discussion supra Part II.
202. Fully evaluating this question is beyond the scope of this Note.
203. Currently, at least two different theories appear to impute scienter. First
is the collective-scienter approach, which “aggregates the misstatements or
omissions by one corporate player with the intent or knowledge of another that
the statements were fraudulent.” Heather F. Crow, Comment, Riding the Fence
on Collective Scienter: Allowing Plaintiffs to Clear the PSLRA Pleading Hurdle,
71 LA. L. REV. 313, 326 (2010). The other approach that the courts have adopted
only permits the imputation of the knowledge of the officer who made the
misstatement. See, e.g., Southland Secs. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc.,
365 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2005); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v.
Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2008).
204. The collective-scienter doctrine only changes how to impute scienter
when there is no single officer who created the statement and had the fraudulent
intent behind the statement. See Crow, supra note 203, at 326.
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questions regarding when courts will impute an officer’s scienter
to the corporation. If a court does not impute the officer’s scienter,
then there is no primary violation of Rule 10b-5 by the corporation,
and not even the SEC enforcement action can be used to hold
corporate officers liable. Nonetheless, despite Justice Breyer’s
statements, if a single officer composes a statement with fraudulent
intent, a court will likely continue to impute the officer’s guilty
knowledge to the corporation.205 By imputing the officer’s scienter
to the corporation that “makes” the statement, there could still be a
primary violation of Rule 10b-5, and thus the SEC could still
impose aiding-and-abetting liability on the corporate officer.
Nevertheless, the SEC enforcement action should not be relied
upon as the primary deterrence mechanism for fraudulent conduct.
Due to its limited resources, the SEC cannot prosecute every
reported securities violation.206 This would still be the case even if
Congress provided the agency with substantially more resources
and funding.207 Additionally, the SEC tends to pursue the larger,
more highly visible actors rather than the smaller, less noticeable
claims.208 Finally, both Congress and the courts have
acknowledged that private securities litigation is a “necessary
supplement” to the SEC enforcement action.209 In fact, the
Supreme Court has recognized the implied private action as the
most effective means of enforcing the securities laws.210 The SEC
has acknowledged that the private right of action is critical to the
enforcement of Section 10(b);211 thus, it is also critical to
enforcement of Rule 10b-5. It is unwise to rely on the SEC
enforcement action to prevent fraudulent conduct because the 10b5 private action provides a necessary complement to deliver the
greatest deterrent effect.

205. See Crow, supra note 203, at 326.
206. Sommer, supra note 20, at 419 (citing Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d
1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1984)).
207. See id. at 419 n.34 (quoting Private Litigation Under the Federal
Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 36 (1993) (statement of William
R. McLucas, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC)).
208. See Reiser, supra note 187, at 264.
209. Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the
Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961,
969 (1994).
210. See id. at 969 (quoting Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner,
472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985)).
211. See id. at 969 (quoting Brief for the Sec. and Exch. Comm’n as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Partial Affirmance at 6, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375 (1983) (Nos. 81-680 & 81-1076), 1982 WL 608452 at *6).
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Additionally, private investors are naturally the best individuals
to monitor a company’s activities. An investor has a personal
interest in the company’s actions.212 Acting in his own selfinterest, the individual will monitor the company to ensure it is
taking effective actions to make his investment profitable. It is true
that not every investor has the time or financial acumen to actively
monitor each of his or her investments.213 However, overall, it is
better to have private investors monitor a company’s activities
while the SEC supplements the investors’ oversight. Furthermore,
as the Bernie Madoff scandal demonstrates, the SEC has shown in
recent years how ineffective it can be in catching even extremely
large fraudulent endeavors.214 Due to their vested interest in the
company’s performance, private investors, with support from the
SEC, are the best line of defense against fraud and are more apt to
provide stricter scrutiny of a company’s activities.
C. Rise of Section 20(b)
In Janus, Justice Thomas alluded to the fact that Section 20(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act could provide a remedy to
prosecute defendants who engage in conduct similar to JCM.215
However, he refused to analyze Section 20(b) any further, instead
opting to state that Janus does not address it.216 Section 20(b)
makes it unlawful for a person to violate securities laws by using
another person to carry out the prohibited acts.217 Currently, few
courts have interpreted Section 20(b).218 Previously, Section 20(b)
had been unnecessary in Rule 10b-5 cases because Rule 10b-5
212. What Affects Stock Prices?, HOWTHEMARKETWORKS.COM, http://www.
howthemarketworks.com/popular-topics/stock-price-factors.php (last visited
October 10, 2012) (discussing how company events affect stock prices).
213. Eli Martin Lazarus, Viatical and Life Settlement Securitization: Risks and
Proposed Regulation, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 281 (2010) (discussing how
unsophisticated investors typically employ asset managers for investments).
214. See Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures Before
the H. Comm. of Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Harry
Markopolos, CFA and CFE). In his testimony, Mr. Markopolos claimed to have
provided evidence to the SEC regarding Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme as early
as May 2000. Id. Additionally, he allegedly resubmitted his findings numerous
times in 2000–2008. Id.
215. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296,
2304 n.10, 2311 (2011).
216. Id.
217. Section 20(b) specifically provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, to do any act or thing which it would be unlawful for such
person to do under the provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder through or by means of any other person.” 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (2006).
218. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2311.
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used to impose liability on both corporations and officers.219
Nevertheless, as a result of Janus, the majority seems to infuse life
into Section 20(b).
To impose liability under Section 20(b), there must be control,
culpable participation by the controlling person, and a securities
law violation.220 It could be used to impose liability on corporate
officers who intentionally act through another person or entity,
such as the corporation for which they work, to violate securities
laws. Section 20(b) would impose liability only on the person who
is using the other person to commit the securities law violation.221
Thus, it seems like a viable tool that could aid in correcting the
problems that Janus created. However, due to the lack of
jurisprudence or other authority regarding Section 20(b), it will
take time to determine how effective Section 20(b) will be in
fixing the Janus problem whereby corporate officers can escape
liability for their intentional misstatements that are attributed to the
company.222
The primary question with Section 20(b) is whether the Court
will recognize an implied right of action for it. In Janus, the
majority explicitly noted that it was not addressing whether
Section 20(b) imposed liability on entities acting through innocent
intermediaries.223 Section 20(b) does not contain explicit language
providing for a private right of action.224 In recent years, the Court
has taken a limiting approach regarding private rights of action, as
evident in its recent treatment of the 10b-5 private action.225 Thus,
whether the Supreme Court is willing to recognize a private right
of action for Section 20(b) remains uncertain, and the Janus
opinion gives no significant indication as to which way the Court
is currently leaning.226
219. See id.; P. Gifford Carter, Note, Originator Exposure To Federal
Securities Law Liability When Structuring Asset Backed Securities Transactions,
20 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 271, 293 (2001).
220. Carter, supra note 219, at 294.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 n.10.
224. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (2006).
225. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302–03; Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
226. The Court could imply a private right of action like it did with Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. However, the more likely outcome is that the Supreme
Court will follow the approach it used with Section 17(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act and refuse to imply a private right of action. See Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). In Touche Ross & Co., the Supreme
Court refused to imply a Section 17(a) private right of action due to the lack of
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IV. LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
Undoubtedly, reform is necessary. Based on Central Bank,
Stoneridge, and Janus, clearly the Supreme Court will not be the
avenue for this reform. The Court in Janus reaffirmed its position
that any change regarding liability under a securities law must
come from Congress and not the courts.227 Consequently, the two
potential reform methods would be a congressional statute or an
SEC rule, with the SEC rule being more feasible.
A. Congressional Action
Congress can pass a statute refining the definition of make to
prevent the problems arising from Janus. The statute should clarify
that the person who “makes” a misstatement is “any person or
entity that substantially participates in the drafting or dissemination
of the statement, regardless of the attribution of that statement.”
This language would eliminate the potential for corporate officers
to escape liability based solely on a lack of attribution. The courts
would then bear the responsibility for determining the meaning of
substantially participates. Because Congress is acting, there is no
concern about reinstituting aiding-and-abetting liability for the
10b-5 private action through the definition of make. Congress has
the power to override a judicial interpretation of legislation by
passing new legislation.228 The primary problem with legislative
reform is that passing a new statute is a difficult task. Both houses
express language or legislative history evidencing an intent of Congress to
provide for such an action. See id. at 571. Recent Supreme Court precedent
reaffirms the Court’s unwillingness to imply private rights of action for federal
statutes that do not expressly provide for such in either the statute’s language or
the legislative history. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001).
227. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 (“Any reapportionment of liability in the
securities industry in light of the close relationship between investment advisers
and mutual funds is properly the responsibility of Congress and not the courts.”).
See also Lori Martin et al., United States: Supreme Court Curtails Ability of
Plaintiffs to Hold Secondary Actors Liable in Private Securities Fraud Actions,
MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING (July 5, 2011), http://www.mondaq.com/united
states/x/137642/Fund+Management+Hedge+Mutual+Investment/Supreme+Cou
rt+Curtails+Ability+Of+Plaintiffs+To+Hold+Secondary+Actors+Liable+In+Pri
vate+Securities+Fraud+Actions.
228. For example, in 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA), a portion of which was used to partially override Central
Bank. Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and the
Supreme Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611, 648 (2008). Section 104 of the PSLRA
restored the SEC’s ability to impose aiding-and-abetting liability under Section
10(b). Id.
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of Congress must agree on one proposal—a task that has become
exponentially more difficult due to Congress’s current polarized
state.229
B. SEC Rulemaking
A new SEC rule would be much easier to pass because it only
requires SEC action rather than a vote of Congress.230 Just like a
statute, the rule should clarify the meaning of make to ensure that
corporate officers could not possibly escape liability for their
unattributed misstatements. Yet, unlike a statute, the rule could not
bring back aiding-and-abetting liability for the 10b-5 private
action. The Supreme Court in both Central Bank and Stoneridge
engaged in statutory interpretation of Section 10(b).231 The Court
has already established that an administrative agency cannot
override Supreme Court precedent that interprets a statute.232 Thus,
by conducting statutory interpretation in Central Bank and
Stoneridge, the Supreme Court has foreclosed the possibility of
using an SEC rule to reimplement aiding-and-abetting liability.233
In Janus, however, the Supreme Court only interpreted Rule
10b-5, so the SEC has the authority to override the interpretation.234
Nonetheless, in exercising its rulemaking authority, the SEC must
walk the thin line between clarifying the definition of make and
implementing aiding-and-abetting liability. Keeping this in mind,
one potential version of the rule could be the following: For
purposes of Rule 10b-5, to “make” a misstatement includes
drafting or writing a statement with knowledge that it is false and
229. The Legislative Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse
.gov/our-government/legislative-branch (last visited Oct. 10, 2012); Vic Fazio,
How Did Congress Get So Polarized?, POLITICO (Sept. 11, 2011, 9:39 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/63197.html. See also Liz Sidoti, A
Polarized Congress in a Country Seeking Pragmatism, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan.
5, 2011, 2:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2011/01/05/new-congressswearing-inn804872.html.
230. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, rule passage involves: (1) a
proposed rule; (2) notice of proposed rule published in the Federal Register; (3)
public review period; and (4) final rule adoption and publication. See 5 U.S.C. §
553 (2006).
231. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164 (1994); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148 (2008).
232. See Grundfest, supra note 209, at 984 (quoting Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987)).
233. See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. 164.
234. See Grundfest, supra note 209, at 985 (quoting Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987)); see also
discussion supra Part II.A.
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distributing or having that statement distributed to the public,
irrespective of whether the statement is attributed to the individual
drafting or writing it.
Regardless of the rule’s language, it is likely that any new rule
will be subject to legal challenges claiming that it is a roundabout
attempt to reestablish aiding-and-abetting liability. In making their
determination, courts will be looking at whether the rule is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s abolition of aiding-andabetting liability in Central Bank.235 It should be noted that any
challenge based on Central Bank would not affect the rule’s
applicability to SEC enforcement actions because Congress has
already given the SEC the ability to pursue aiding-and-abetting
liability.236 However, challenges based on reestablishing aidingand-abetting liability will be a problem for the private cause of
action because Congress has yet to reinstitute aiding-and-abetting
liability for the private actions.
The SEC may choose to use expansive language that
potentially contradicts the Court’s prior holding in Central Bank.
Whenever any litigation concerning the validity of the SEC Rule
reaches the Supreme Court, the Court’s ultimate decision regarding
the validity of an expansive SEC Rule is uncertain. Currently, at
least four Justices feel that a broader definition of make is
warranted.237 Predicting how the Court would rule is difficult
because this would partially depend on a case’s factual
circumstances. Thus, the SEC could draft an expansive rule
regarding the definition of make, knowing that the Supreme Court
may strike it down, yet all along hoping that a majority of the
Court will side with them in any subsequent legal action.
V. CONCLUSION
As a result of Janus, the viability of the private 10b-5 cause of
action as a fraud-deterrence mechanism has been undermined. The
majority’s narrow definition for make essentially absolves
corporate officers of responsibility for their fraudulent acts under
the 10b-5 private action, so long as their misstatements are not
attributed to them. As a result, corporate officials will focus on
organizing and distributing their statements in such a way as to
escape potential liability under the private 10b-5 cause of action.
Officers will no longer make the same mistake as the defendant in
235. See id.
236. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (Supp. V 2011).
237. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296,
2305 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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In re Merck & Co., a case in which the misstatements were
attributed to the corporate officer individually, rather than the
company.238
By absolving corporate officers of liability for their action,
Janus eliminates much of the 10b-5 private action’s prophylactic
effect. Instead of increasing deterrence, the Supreme Court has
removed much of the disincentives to engaging in fraudulent
conduct. Consequently, either Congress or the SEC must take
action because the Court refuses to be the engine for reform.
Therefore, despite the potential far-reaching problems emanating
from Janus, the decision may actually result in some of the most
significant securities legislation in the last decade, as either the
SEC, Congress, or both may finally take meaningful action
regarding the future of the private 10b-5 cause of action.
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